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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to elaborate the picture of strategies and tactics for 
informationseeking and searching by focusing on the heuristic elements of such strategies and tactics. 
Design/methodology/approach –A conceptual analysis of a sample of 31 pertinent investigations 
wasconducted to find out how researchers have approached heuristics in the above context since the 
1970s. To achieve this, the study draws on the ideas produced within the research programmes 
on Heuristics and Biases, and Fast and Frugal Heuristics. 
Findings – Researchers have approached the heuristic elements in three major ways. First, these 
elementsare defined as general level constituents of browsing strategies in particular. Second, 
heuristics areapproached as search tips. Third, there are examples of conceptualizations of individual 
heuristics.Familiarity heuristic suggests that people tend to prefer sources that have worked well in 
similar situations inthe past. Recognition heuristic draws on an all-or-none distinction of the 
information objects, based on cuessuch as information scent. Finally, representativeness heuristic is 
based on recalling similar instances ofevents or objects and judging their typicality in terms of genres, 
for example. 
Research limitations/implications – As the study focuses on three heuristics only, the findings 
cannotbe generalized to describe the use of all heuristic elements of strategies and tactics for 
information seekingand searching. 
Originality/value – The study pioneers by providing an in-depth analysis of the ways in which the 
heuristicelements are conceptualized in the context of information seeking and searching. The 
findings contribute tothe elaboration of the conceptual issues of information behavior research. 
Keywords Heuristics, Information search, Strategy, Information seeking, Conceptual analysis, Tactic 
Paper type Conceptual paper 
Introduction 
Since the 1970s, researchers have identified a number of strategies and tactics for information seeking 
and searching (for an overview, see Savolainen, 2016). Following the classic definitions formulated 
by Bates (1979b, pp. 206-207), information search tactic can be understood as a move (or moves) 
made with the purpose of improving or speeding the search in some way, while information seeking 
(or searching) strategy is defined as a plan for the whole search. Thus understood, “strategic” and 
“tactical” are fundamental qualities of information seeking and searching because they suggest what 
information is important and what to ignore, and how to access the information that is considered 
important or desirable (Hjørland, 2011, pp. 599-601). Often, such strategic and tactical judgments 
incorporate heuristic elements, for example, rules of thumb that are used to facilitate the search 
process. However, researchers have diverse views on what types of strategies and tactics are heuristic 
and how to identify the heuristic elements. For example, Bates (1979b) defined a number of search 
tactics that can be regarded a search tips with heuristic value, while Marchionini (1995, p. 106) 
suggested that heuristic elements are particularly characteristic of browsing strategies.     
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In information behaviour research so far, the picture of the nature of heuristics has 
remained somewhat vague. Often, the concept of heuristic is taken for granted, as if it were self-
explanatory. However, the issues related to heuristics are far from self-evident. The main goal of the 
present study is to add conceptual clarity by examining how researchers have approached the heuristic 
elements of strategies and tactics for information seeking and searching. As explained in more detail 
below, the above question will be examined by concentrating on the familiarity, recognition and 
representativeness heuristics. This topic is important because the study of the heuristic elements 
enables a more nuanced picture of the ways in which people identify, select and access information 
sources particularly in cases in which the information-seeking process is constrained by the lack of 
time and cognitive overload. 
In general, heuristics can be understood as decision-making strategies derived from 
experience with similar problems, using readily accessible, though loosely applicable, information to 
problem solving, learning, or discovery (Mousavi and Gigerenzer, 2014, p. 1673). From this 
perspective, heuristics are something akin to strategies that people use consciously and deliberately 
in order to simplify judgmental tasks that would otherwise be too difficult to solve (Gilovich and 
Griffin, 2002, pp. 3-4). However, heuristics can also be used unconsciously. This approach is often 
referred to as intuition: decision makers sense what to do without being able to explain why (Mousavi 
and Gigerenzer, 2014, p. 1673).  
Even though heuristics may not guarantee an optimal solution, they can facilitate 
information seeking. In real-world contexts people tend not to invest much time and energy in order 
to plan and execute their searches systematically. Instead, they often behave “irrationally” by taking 
heuristic shortcuts (Pharo and Järvelin, 2006, pp. 230-231). Empirical support for this assumption has 
been received from studies examining consumer information seeking on the Internet. Sillence and 
associates (2007) demonstrated that consumers first engaged in rapid heuristic processing of 
information. Within the first few minutes of interaction they sifted information, quickly recognizing 
and rejecting general portals and sales sites and sites they did not trust, primarily on the basis of 
design features affecting the “look and feel” of a site. Ylikoski (2005, p. 189) found that among 
consumers, heuristically oriented search methods such as chaining, browsing, and brief search 
accounted about 64% of online search events, while the proportion of events indicating systematic 
(analytic) search efforts was about 36%.   
The above examples suggest that heuristics can occupy a significant role in information 
seeking. On the other hand, information searchers´ preference for heuristic approaches may be 
associated with the “cognitive miser” metaphor. It suggests, perhaps unfortunately, that heuristics are 
the products of lazy and inattentive minds. The distinction between systematic (analytic) and heuristic 
information seeking and processing is not new. For example, Chaiken (1980) proposed that when 
processing information systematically, individuals exert considerable cognitive effort and actively 
attempt to comprehend and evaluate the message’s arguments. Conversely, when processing 
information heuristically, individuals exert comparably little effort, rely on more accessible 
information, and select information sources on the basis of their identity or other non-content cues. 
Chaiken (1980, p. 752) concluded that heuristic processing is more likely to occur with low issue 
involvement, low perceived capacity to process information, or when an individual does not perceive 
more in-depth processing to be of much consequence. However, heuristic information searching may 
not be inferior to analytic information processing because heuristics can be helpful when there is a 
need to find quickly and still effectively enough information by making use of simple methods which 
have worked in similar situations in the past (Marsh, 2002, pp. 49-50).  The growing supply of 
information particularly from the Internet often necessitates the use of heuristics in order to 
concentrate on the most pertinent items.  
To examine the above issues in greater detail, a conceptual analysis was made by 
drawing on the ideas developed within two prominent research programmes, that is, Heuristics and 
Biases, and Fast and Frugal Heuristics. These programmes examine heuristics in contexts in which 
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decision makers make judgments under uncertainty. The above research approaches were chosen as 
a point of departure because they are generic enough for the study of heuristic elements in particular 
domains such as strategies and tactics for information seeking and searching. To this end, the 
familiarity, recognition and representativeness heuristics identified by the above research 
programmes appeared to be particularly relevant. Other research approaches to heuristics were less 
relevant for the study of such strategies and tactics. For example, the heuristic-systematic model of 
information processing model developed by Chaiken (1980) explains how people receive and process 
persuasive messages. Due to this focus, however, the above model is more useful for the analysis of 
information use, rather than information seeking and searching.   
Following Wilson (2000, pp. 49-50), information seeking is approached as a behaviour 
which encompasses the range of ways employed in discovering and accessing information resources 
(both humans and systems) in response to goals and intentions. Information searching behaviour is 
defined as a subset of information seeking - a micro-level behaviour - referring to the purposive 
actions involved in interacting with an information search system, including information retrieval 
(IR) systems and the World Wide Web (WWW). Furthermore, drawing on Bates (1979b, pp. 206-
207), information seeking (or searching) strategy is understood as a plan for the whole search, while 
information search tactic is defined as a set of moves made with the purpose of facilitating the search 
so that the information seeking strategy can be realized in practice. 
To give background, the next section reviews diverse approaches to heuristics, followed 
by the specification of the research setting and the report of the research findings. The final sections 
discuss the findings and draw conclusions about their significance for information behaviour research.  
 
Approaches to heuristics 
 
The term heuristic (εὑρίσκω) has its roots in Greek, meaning “serving to find out or discover” 
(Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009, p. 108). The earliest references to heuristics can be traced to Ancient 
Greece where mathematicians attempted to find methods for findings proofs and for arriving at new 
discoveries (Groner et al., 1983, p. 1). Later on, heuristics were associated with the search for 
algorithms needed in the solving of mathematical problems. In the end of the 19th century, 
psychologists became interested in the study of the structure and direction of thought processes. In 
this context, the term heuristic was primarily used to examine problem-solution trees. Later on, 
heuristic search became a central topic of interest in the field of artificial intelligence (Pearl, 1984). 
In this context, heuristic search refers to a problem-solving technique that by means of algorithms 
explores a space of problem states, i.e., successive and alternative stages in the problem-solving 
process (Edelkamp and Schrödl, 2012). The objective is to find a sequence of actions that transforms 
the start state into a goal state, and also optimizes some measure of the quality of the solution.  
From the perspective of the present study, however, the early developments of cognitive 
science are more pertinent for the conceptualization of heuristics. Herbert Simon (1957) first 
proposed that people satisfice rather than maximize in decision making. Maximization means 
optimization, the process of finding the best solution for a problem, whereas satisficing means finding 
a good-enough solution. Simon (1957) approached heuristics as strategies that guide information 
search and modify problem representations to facilitate solutions. He used the term satisficing both 
as a generic term for everything that is not optimizing as well as for a specific heuristic: in order to 
select a good alternative from a series of options encountered sequentially, a person sets an aspiration 
level, chooses the first one that meets the aspiration, and then terminates search (Gigerenzer and 
Brighton, 2009, p. 108). For Simon, humans rely on heuristics not simply because their cognitive 
limitations prevent them from optimizing but also because of the requirements of the task 
environment.  
 
Heuristics as cognitive bias 
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In the early 1970s, the term heuristic acquired a different connotation. Daniel Kahneman, Amos 
Tversky, and their collaborators published a series of experiments in which people’s reasoning was 
interpreted as exhibiting fallacies and cognitive illusions. The experimental findings set in motion the 
Heuristics and Biases (HB) research programme. It examines how people make real-world judgments 
and the conditions under which those judgments are unreliable from the perspective of formal logic 
and probability theory. It is assumed that cognitive processes produce both valid and invalid 
judgments and that systematic deviations from rationality appear as cognitive illusions (Gilovich and 
Griffin, 2002). The main contributions of early HB studies can be crystallised in three major heuristics 
identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1974):  
• Availability heuristic - a mental shortcut that occurs when people make judgments about the 
probability of events by the ease with which examples come to mind. When an infrequent 
event such as an earthquake can be brought easily and vividly to mind, people tend to 
overestimate its likelihood.  
• Representativeness heuristic - a mental shortcut that is used while making judgments about 
the probability of an event under uncertainty or judging a situation based on how similar the 
prospects are to the prototypes or stereotypes the person holds in his or her mind. The 
representativeness heuristic is used, for example, while judging the credibility of a newspaper 
article. An individual article has a high representativeness for a category if it is very similar 
to a prototype of that category, for example, a tabloid article.  
• Anchoring and adjustment heuristic describes the common human tendency to rely too 
heavily on the first piece of information offered (the "anchor") when making decisions. This 
heuristic is used particularly in situations where people estimate a number. At first, they are 
offered an "anchor" such as whether the percentage of African countries which are members 
of the United Nations would be larger or smaller than 65% - and then shifting either up or 
down to reach an answer that seems plausible. The experiments conducted by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974, p. 1128) revealed that people did not shift far enough away from the offered 
anchor. Hence the anchor contaminates the estimate. To take a more recent example, the 
evaluation of the relevance of items provided by a search engine results page (SERP) may 
draw on the use of the above heuristic. For instance, a Google SERP usually contains 10 items, 
thus offering an anchor for the searchers. People tend to focus on the first SERP because they 
believe that these 10 items provide access to the most relevant sources (Jansen and Spink, 
2005). 
Later on, HB researchers elaborated the nature of the availability and representativeness heuristics 
by providing a definition of attribute substitution (Kahneman, 2003, p. 707). It occurs when an 
individual has to make a judgment of a target attribute that is computationally complex, and instead 
substitutes a more easily calculated heuristic attribute that comes more readily to mind. This 
substitution is thought of as taking place in the automatic intuitive judgment system, rather than the 
more self-aware reflective system. For example, in a face-to-face conversation with a stranger, 
judging their intelligence is more computationally complex than judging the colour of their skin. If 
an individual has a stereotype about the relative intelligence of whites, blacks, and Asians, that racial 
attribute might substitute for the more intangible attribute of intelligence (Kahneman and Frederick, 
2002). As a part of the studies on attribute substitution, HB researchers elaborated the nature of 
selection (or choice) heuristics that are automatic in nature (Frederick, 2002). For example, choosing 
by liking heuristic is based on an immediate and spontaneous affective evaluation. This heuristic is 
governed by rapid and intuitive processes, resulting in liking or disliking of diverse options. 
Therefore, it is also labeled as “How-do-I-feel-about-it” heuristic (Schwarz and Clore, 1988) and 
affect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2002). An affective evaluation may work in conjunction with cognitive 
evaluation: the former is used as a quick initial screen for alternatives, whereas the latter is reserved 
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for those alternatives that surpass some affective threshold. Thus, choosing by liking heuristic 
suggests preferring an option that spontaneously generates the most favorable affective response.  
The repertoire of heuristics of interest to the present study can be extended by introducing the 
familiarity heuristic. Even though HB researchers have not used the term familiarity heuristic, it can 
be regarded as a legitimate subtype of the availability heuristic discussed above. Ashcraft and 
Radvansky (2010, p. 442) prefer the term “familiarity bias” while characterizing the distortions 
stemming from the availability heuristic. Nevertheless, the use of the term familiarity heuristic can 
be justified in that Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 1127) characterized familiarity as one of the key 
factors affecting the retrievability of instances from the memory. This means that events are judged 
as more frequent or important because they are more familiar in memory (Ashcraft and Radvansky, 
2010, p. 442). However, the use of the availability heuristic, as well as the familiarity heuristic is not 
merely affected by the experienced ease of recall from memory (Schwarz and Vaughn, 2002). In 
addition, the significance of the recalled content plays a role particularly when the decision-making 
task is of high personal relevance. The familiarity heuristic suggests, for example, that a person 
prefers a particular website when he or she recalls that it provided useful information in a decision-
making situation in the past.  
Gilovich and Griffin (2002, pp. 3-4) emphasize that although heuristics are distinguished from 
normative reasoning processes by patterns of biased judgments, heuristics themselves are sensible 
estimation procedures that are by no measure “irrational.” Although heuristics may yield “quick and 
dirty” solutions, they draw on underlying processes such as feature matching and memory retrieval 
that are highly sophisticated. Thus, heuristics such as availability, familiarity, representativeness, and 
choosing by liking can be regarded as highly efficient mental shortcuts that provide subjectively 
compelling and often quite serviceable solutions to judgmental problems.  Gilovich and Griffin (2002, 
pp. 3-4) remind, however, that heuristics are just that - serviceable, not exact or perfectly accurate.  
 
Fast and Frugal Heuristics 
 
Since the 1990s, Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleagues have developed an alternative research 
programme labeled as Fast and Frugal Heuristics (FFH). Intellectually, this programme is rooted in 
Simon’s (1957) work on satisficing and on ecological and evolutionary views of cognition, where 
adaptive function and success is central, as opposed to logical structure and consistency emphasized 
by the HB approach. FFH researchers take a critical stance on the HB approach because it is assumed 
to be too focused on how heuristics lead to fallacies, thus giving a negative connotation to heuristics 
more generally (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009, p. 115). FFH researchers also question the view that 
that heuristics would mean an irrational approach to decision making. Conversely, they maintain that 
heuristics work when there is a positive correlation between a recognized object, for example, an 
information source and a target value such as the solving of a health problem (Raab and Gigerenzer, 
2015). 
In general, fast and frugal heuristics can be defined as strategies that ignore a part of 
information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and accurately than more 
complex methods (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 454). A heuristic is fast if it can solve a 
problem in little time and frugal if it can solve it with little information by intentionally ignoring cues, 
weights, and dependencies between cues (Gigerenzer, 2008, p. 7; Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009, p. 
111).) Fast and frugal heuristics are typically composed of three building blocks. First, search rules 
specify where to look for information. Second, stopping rules specify when to end the information 
search. Third, decision rules specify how to make a final decision (Raab and Gigerenzer, 2015).  
FFH researchers have specified a few “one-good-reason heuristics” drawing on the 
ideas of satisficing. Perhaps the most widely known fast and frugal heuristic is take-the-best (TTB) 
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996, pp. 653-654). TTB is based on the recognition principle: if only 
one of the two objects such as websites is considered as relevant for decision making, then choose 
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the recognized object. If neither of the two objects is recognized as relevant, then choose randomly 
between them. If both of the objects are recognized as relevant, then proceed to search for cue values. 
For the two objects, retrieve the cue values of the highest ranking cue from memory. Further, decide 
whether the cue discriminates between two objects: if one has a positive cue value, e.g., recency and 
the other does not. If the cue discriminates, then stop searching for cue values. If the cue does not 
discriminate, continue with the next cue until a cue that discriminates is found. Finally, TTB advises 
to choose the object with the positive cue value. If no cue discriminates, then choose randomly.  
More recently, FFH researchers have characterized the recognition principle more 
broadly and defined it as a key heuristic in itself (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 2011; Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 76). The recognition heuristic (RH) suggests: if one of two alternatives is 
recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized alternative has the higher value with 
respect to the criterion (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 460).  Thus, RH is even simpler and 
faster than TTB because there is no need to continue the search in order to find out which of the cues 
has the highest ranking value. Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011, p. 460) remind that from the 
perspective of heuristics, the word recognition can be understood at different levels of specificity. 
First, one may have no knowledge of an object or event because one has never heard, smelled, 
touched, tasted, or seen it before. Such objects can be defined as “unrecognized.” Second, there can 
be “merely recognized” objects that one has experienced before but of which one has absolutely no 
further knowledge beyond this initial sense of recognition. For example, one may recognize another's 
face but cannot remember his or her name. The third level of knowledge comprises mere recognition 
plus further knowledge; not only does one recognize the object, but one can provide additional 
information about it, such as where one encountered it.   
The above examples suggest that recognition is a strong force in people´s choices 
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996, p. 663). If a scholar browses a new book focusing on his or her 
research topic but does not recognize the name of the author, he or she may make the inference that 
the book is probably not worth borrowing from the library. Further, if he or she does not recognize 
most of the authors included in the list of references, he or she may conclude that the book is not even 
worth reading. Thus, RH orients a limited search by defining stopping points (Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein, 1996, p. 663). Stopping rules are particularly important while seeking information under 
limited time.  
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002, p. 77) contend that RH needs to be distinguished from 
the availability heuristic proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) because it is based on recall, 
not recognition. The importance of RH originates from the fact that a sense of recognition in 
consciousness appear earlier than recollection (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 460). People 
recognize far more items than they can recall. The availability heuristic refers to the degree of 
knowledge (or amount of experience) a person has of a task or object. RH, in contrast, treats 
recognition as a binary, all-or-none distinction. RH-based search is stopped whenever one object is 
recognized as relevant and the other is not; no further information is looked up about the recognized 
object.  
Bishop (2006) evaluated critically the nature of fast and frugal heuristics and considered 
take-the-best as the most impressive heuristic to come out of the FFH research programme. 
Nevertheless, FFH are not without challenges. First, the evidence for thinking that people are 
naturally disposed to use FFH is still spotty (Bishop, 2006, p. 208). One of the limitations of FFH is 
that such heuristics are “domain specific” (Bishop, 2006, p. 208). RH, for example, only works in 
environments where recognition is correlated with the criterion to which it applies ecologically. 
Further, TTB seems to be reliable in rather non-obvious and complex conditions. Bishop (2006, p. 
208) concluded that FFH seem to be in principle highly reliable, but it is still unclear how people 
would be able to apply them properly for the needs of everyday problem solving.  
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HB and FFH: comparative notions 
 
According to Polonioli (2013), the core disagreement between the HB and FFH approaches is, what 
constitutes a rational judgment in the first place. On the other hand, the conflict between HB and FFH 
seems to a matter of emphasis because both approaches suggest that heuristics are strategies that 
usually succeed but sometimes not (Polonioli, 2011, p. 137).  
Kelman (2011) reviewed in detail the “heuristic debate” between the HB and FFH 
approaches. He concluded that despite diverse viewpoints to the definition of heuristics, HB and FFH 
researchers share much in common. They agree that people frequently and quite reasonably use 
heuristics, making factual judgments or reaching decisions about what actions best serve their ends 
without making use of all potentially relevant information or computational abilities. Kelman (2011) 
showed, however, that the operationalization of individual heuristics like availability and recognition 
is a demanding task in particular domains such as criminal law policy because the above heuristics 
are constructs that defy an exact definition. As the findings of the present study suggest, the same 
difficulty is faced in the field of information behaviour research, too. 
 
Research questions 
 
The above review allowed the identification of a few key heuristics defined by HB and FFH 
researchers. These heuristics include anchoring and adjusment, availability, familiarity, choosing by 
liking, recognition, representativeness, and take-the-best. The examples characterizing the use of 
these heuristics in the context of decision making suggest that they would also be relevant for the  
study of strategies and tactics for information seeking and searching because these activities are 
constitutive of decision making and problem solving. However, the preliminary analysis of the 
research material revealed that the number of relevant studies characterizing the use of anchoring and 
adjustment, availability, choosing by liking, and take-the-best heuristics in the context of information 
seeking and searching is really low; only a few implicit examples of these heuristics were available. 
Therefore, the attention was focused on the familiarity, recognition and representativeness heuristics, 
simply due to the fact that there is more research material available elucidating the nature of these 
heuristics. Moreover, the conceptualizations of these three heuristics were more explicit. To examine 
the above issues in greater detail, the present study addresses the following research questions: 
 
• RQ1. In which ways have researchers approached the heuristic elements of strategies and 
tactics for information seeking and searching?  
• RQ2. In which ways, if any have researchers characterized the familiarity, recognition and 
representativeness heuristics as elements of such strategies and tactics?  
Answers to RQ1 provide an overall picture of the conceptualizations of heuristics in the context 
of information seeking strategies and tactics, while answers to RQ2 exemplify how the elements of 
the familiarity, recognition and representativeness heuristics appear in the characterizations of such 
strategies and tactics. Even though it turned out that researchers have not explicitly referred to 
individual heuristics such as these, their elements could be reliably identified in the characterizations 
of strategies and tactics for information seeking and tactics.   
To strengthen the focus of the study, investigations characterizing satisficing as a constituent of 
information seeking and searching were excluded for two major reasons. First, although Simon (1957) 
considered satisficing as a specific heuristic that can be used to select a good alternative from a series 
of options encountered sequentially, other researchers have primarily approached satisficing as a 
fundamental characteristic of bounded rationality. Therefore, due to its generic nature, satisficing can 
be understood as a characteristic common to diverse heuristics such as take-the best, rather than an 
individual heuristic per se (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996). Second, the analysis of the studies 
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conceptualizing the nature of satisficing in the context of information seeking and searching revealed 
that satisficing is not approached in terms of heuristics (e.g., Prabha et al., 2007; Warwick et al., 
2009). Instead, satisficing is defined as a general level construct indicating what searches to conduct 
in order to obtain “good enough” information and when to stop the searching process. Another 
limitation of the present study is that it excludes the question of whether individual heuristics such as 
familiarity and representativeness would serve as effective tools in information seeking or whether 
they lead to bias in the identification and selection of information sources. It is evident that the 
analysis of the above issue would have required a separate empirical study.   
 
Research material and analysis 
 
To answer the above research questions, the main attention was directed to studies explicitly 
conceptualizing heuristic elements in information seeking and searching. For the systematic 
identification of pertinent material, databases such as Library and Information Science Abstracts, 
EBSCO and Google Scholar were used. The keywords used in literature searching included 
information seeking, information search, browsing, strategy, tactic, heuristic, rules of thumb, 
satisficing and mental shortcut, for example. This effort resulted in the identification of 65 potentially 
relevant articles, books and conference papers explicitly referring to heuristics in the characterizations 
of strategies and tactics for information seeking and searching. These studies mainly originated from 
the field of library and information science; in addition, there were a few investigations published in 
the forums of cognitive science, communication research and psychology. Based on the preliminary 
analysis, redundant studies repeating the findings of prior studies were eliminated, resulting in the 
final sample of 31 pertinent investigations published within the period of 1979-2016.  
The research material was examined by means of conceptual analysis. This method can 
be defined as an approach that treats the components of the study objects as classes of objects, events, 
properties, or relationships (Furner, 2004). The analysis involves defining the meaning of a concept 
and its attributes by identifying and specifying the contexts in which it is classified under the concept 
in question. To conduct the conceptual analysis, relevant text portions (paragraphs and sentences) 
explicitly characterizing heuristics as elements of strategies or tactics for information seeking and 
searching were first identified from the research material by means of open coding preceding the 
designation of categories. To identify relevant material for the first research question, i.e., “In which 
ways have researchers approached the heuristic elements of strategies and tactics for information 
seeking and searching?”, terms indicating categories used in the preliminary coding included, for 
example, “information seeking heuristics” (Gonzales, 2013), “rules of thumb” (Hilligoss and Rieh, 
2008) and “information search heuristic” (Harter, 1986). To exemplify, the open coding identified 
Harter´s (1986, p. 170) explicit definition of search heuristic suggesting that “a search tactic or 
heuristic is a move made to advance a particular strategy”.  After the preliminary coding, the research 
material was read several times to allow for other categories to emerge. This resulted in the 
identification of a few novel categories such as “search tips” and “personal heuristics”.  
Similarly, to identify relevant material for the second research question, i.e, “In which 
ways, if any have researchers characterized the familiarity, recognition and representativeness 
heuristics as elements of such strategies and tactics?”, open coding preceding the designation of 
categories was used. To this end, the attention was devoted to descriptions that incorporated elements 
of the familiarity, recognition and representativeness heuristics. Such elements were identified by 
drawing on the definitions reviewed above in the sections describing the HB and FFH approaches. 
An example of familiarity - a key category of the HB - identified in the open coding is Check. It is 
one of the search tactics identified by Bates (1979b). This tactic exemplifies the familiarity heuristic 
because Check is based on the identification of similarities between earlier attempts to seek 
information: “review the original request and compare it to the current search topic to see that it is 
the same” (Bates, 1979b, p. 208). To compare, recognition – a key category of FFH is exemplified 
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by the construct of information scent which refers to cues that inform the value or potential gain of 
the patches (Fu and Pirolli, 2007). Table I provides illustrative examples of the coding procedure. 
 
 Familiarity Recognition Representativeness 
Key rationale behind 
the heuristic 
 
Events are judged as 
more frequent or 
important because 
they are more familiar 
in memory (Ashcraft 
and Radvansky, 2010, 
p. 442).  
 
If one of two 
alternatives is 
recognized and the 
other is not, the 
recognized alternative 
has the higher value 
with respect to the 
criterion (Gigerenzer 
and Gaissmaier, 2011, 
p. 460) 
Making judgments 
about the probability 
of an event under 
uncertainty or judging 
a situation based on 
how similar the 
prospects are to the 
prototypes the person 
holds in his or her 
mind (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974) 
The use of the 
heuristic in 
information seeking 
and searching 
Recalling situations in 
which an information 
source provided useful 
information in the past 
and preferring the 
same source on the 
basis of earlier use 
experiences 
Binary, all-or-none 
distinction of an 
information object in 
an environment; an 
information source is 
preferred on the basis 
of its distinctiveness 
Evaluating the 
relevance of an 
information source  
on the basis of its 
typicality or genre 
 
 
Examples of the 
approaches to 
individual heuristics 
as elements of 
strategies and tactics 
for information 
seeking and 
searching 
Information search 
tactics, e.g., Check  
(Bates, 1979b) 
Known site strategy, 
(Fidel et al., 1999) 
Known address 
strategy (Thatcher, 
2006)  
Credibility judgment 
based on the 
familiarity with an 
information source 
(Hilligoss and Rieh, 
2008) 
Recognition of 
“information scent” as 
a proximal cue of the 
relevance of an 
information source 
particularly in 
electronic 
environments 
(Fu and Pirolli, 2007; 
Pirolli, 2007; Sundar 
et al., 2007; Tomasi, 
2014) 
Identification of 
relevant genres while 
seeking for pleasure 
reading (Ross, 1999) 
Credibility judgment 
based on media-
related and 
endorsement-based 
beliefs of sources´ 
authoritativeness  
(Hilligoss and Rieh, 
2008; Sundar, 2008) 
 
Table I. The coding of the research material. 
 
The conceptual analysis scrutinized how the heuristic elements are defined and 
described in the characterizations of strategies and tactics for information seeking and searching. 
More specifically, the analysis was based on the identification of similarities and differences between 
diverse characterizations. The analysis was rendered difficult in that degree of specificity of the 
definition of heuristic elements varied from a study to another. On the one hand, there were exact 
specifications. For example, language heuristics characterized by Harter (1986, p. 197) advises the 
searcher to “take utmost care to identify all possible ways of representing a concept, if a language 
field such as title, abstract, or full text is the object of search”. In most studies, however, the 
characterizations of the relationship between heuristic and strategy or tactic drew on shared elements 
or attributes, indicating a loose connection. For example, Bates (1979b, p. 207) described search 
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strategies and idea tactics as “heuristic” in the sense that “they can facilitate the search process, but 
not necessarily”. This suggests that search tactics and heuristics share the attribute of uncertainty. 
Similarly, the analysis of the familiarity, recognition and representativeness heuristics indicated that 
the relationships between heuristic and strategy or tactic draw on shared elements or attributes. As 
specified in Table I, the relationships were based on analogy, similarity between earlier and current 
situations, as well as perception of the prototypicality of an object. 
Even though some of the characterizations describing the relationships between 
heuristics and information searching tactics were vague, the analysis served the purpose of an 
exploratory study. Most importantly, the study allowed the identification of a few concrete examples 
of the ways in which the familiarity, recognition and representativeness heuristics figure in such 
strategies and tactics.  
 
Findings 
 
The findings will be discussed by starting from the general level approaches to heuristic elements of 
strategies and tactics for information seeking and searching. Two main approaches were identified: 
heuristics as general constituents of strategies for information seeking and searching, and heuristics 
as search tips. The picture of heuristics will then be refined by reporting the findings concerning the 
conceptualization of familiarity, recognition and representativeness heuristics. 
 
Heuristics as general constituents of strategies for information seeking and searching 
 
The conceptual analysis revealed considerable variation in the ways which researchers have 
characterized the heuristic elements of information seeking and searching. In most cases, such 
elements have been approached at a general level only. For example, Ylikoski (2005) described 
heuristic searches by referring to the generic features of information seeking identified by Ellis 
(1989). Such features include starting (identifying where to start), chaining (following hyperlinks), 
browsing (scanning top level pages), differentiating (selecting sites for further analysis), and 
monitoring (using alerts or revisiting favorites). General level characterizations such as these are not 
without problems because they leave open the question of the criteria by which activities like starting 
and differentiating would be regarded as heuristic in nature. Individual characteristics are just labeled 
as heuristic. This approach is also evident in studies in which the concept of heuristic is used to denote 
related phenomena. For example, Gonzales (2013) aimed at examining the “information seeking 
heuristics” of undergraduate students, but the empirical findings reveal that in fact, the study describes 
these students´ information source preferences. 
However, there are studies characterizing the heuristic elements in a more focused 
manner. Marchionini (1995, p. 8) distinguished two major categories of search strategies by their 
level of goal-directedness, formality and planning. Analytical strategies can be characterized by 
qualities such as planned, systematic, specialized, goal-driven and formal, whereas browsing 
strategies are opportunistic, heuristic, data driven and informal. This suggests that the heuristic 
elements in information searching are associated with spontaneous (rather than planned) ways of 
identifying and accessing information sources, as well as interacting with them. Marchionini (1995, 
p. 106) differentiated between three main types of browsing. Directed browsing occurs when this 
activity is systematic, focused and directed by a specific object or target. Examples include checking 
a list for a known item, and verifying information such as dates. Semi-directed browsing occurs when 
browsing is predictive or generally purposeful: the target is less definite and browsing is less 
systematic. An example is entering a single, general term into a database and casually examining the 
retrieved records. Finally, undirected browsing occurs when there is no real goal and very little focus. 
Examples include flipping through a magazine and surfing on the Web.  
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Common to studies reviewed above is that they leave open the question about the exact 
meaning of heuristics in the context of information seeking and searching. Heuristics are approached 
as general constituents of strategies for information seeking, searching or browsing. However, 
Marchionini (1995, p. 7) shed additional light on the nature of browsing behaviour by proposing that 
it draws on the recognition of relevant information. This suggests, though implicitly, that browsing 
makes use of the recognition heuristic in particular. The importance of this heuristic becomes 
understandable in that most forms of browsing, for example, surfing on the Web rely strongly on 
vision - our predominating sense (Bates, 2007). Naturally, recognizing an information object, for 
example, an underlined hyperlink by eye is insufficient for the recognition: in addition, the object has 
to be interpreted cognitively as something meaningful. The heuristic elements in browsing may 
originate from the use of other senses, too. As Bates (2007) put it, “we may examine something only 
visually, or with touch or other senses, such as smell or hearing”. Interestingly, the heuristic potential 
of the sense of smell is conceptualized - though metaphorically - in Information Foraging theory. It 
proposes that people base their decisions about the relevance of information sources on “information 
scent” (Pirolli, 2007). The foraging approach will be discussed in more detail in the context of 
recognition heuristic below. 
 
Heuristics as search tips 
 
Another general level approach to heuristic elements is to describe them as rules of thumb serving as 
search tips. One of the pioneering researchers approaching heuristic elements from this perspective 
is Marcia Bates. Her studies on information search tactics (Bates, 1979b) and idea tactics (Bates, 
1979a) are among the most important contributions to the early studies characterizing heuristic 
elements of information searching, even though she did not explicitly define the nature of heuristics. 
Both types of tactics were characterized generally as “heuristic” in the sense that they can facilitate 
the search process, but not necessarily (Bates, 1979a, p. 281; Bates, 1979b, p. 207). There can be 
good or effective information tactics and bad ones. The same caveat applies to heuristics more 
generally (Gilovich and Griffin, 2002, pp. 3-4). Interestingly, Bates (1979b, p. 213) also devoted 
attention to a central question common to heuristics and search tactics: when to stop the information 
search? To this end, pertinent questions include, for example, how does one judge when enough 
information or citations have been gathered, and how does one decide to give up an unsuccessful 
search? 
Bates identified no less than 29 diverse search tactics and 16 idea tactics. Overall, search 
tactics are thought likely to improve the effectiveness or efficiency of a search (Bates, 1979b, pp. 
206-207). The focus of idea tactics is psychological: they are intended to improve the information 
specialists´ thinking and creative processes in searching particularly in cases in which the searcher is 
“stumped” (Bates, 1979a, p. 280). Thus, basically, idea tactics may serve as rules of thumb. For 
example, the idea tactic labeled as Focus advises the searcher to “look at the query more narrowly, in 
one or both of two senses: 1) to move from the whole query to a part of it or 2) to move from a broader 
to a narrower conceptualization of the query” (Bates, 1979a, p. 282). 
Somewhat later, Harter (1986, pp. 179-204) dedicated a whole chapter to the issues 
“search strategies and heuristics” in his textbook Online information retrieval: concepts, principles 
and techniques. Drawing on Bates´s (1979b, pp. 206-207) definition, he approached heuristic and 
search tactic synonymously: “a search tactic or heuristic is a move made to advance a particular 
strategy” (Harter, 1986, p. 170). From this perspective, a search strategy means an overall plan for 
achieving a goal, while heuristics are “actions taken to meet limited objectives, either planned in 
advance or formulated as the search progresses, to help achieve that goal” (Harter, 1986, p. 170). He 
compared online searching to a heuristic problem-solving activity that proceeds from the establishing 
an overall search strategy to specific search formulations (Harter, 1986, p. 194).  
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A closer analysis of the heuristics for online searching described by Harter (1986, pp. 
194-202) reveals that they primarily deal with search tips of diverse kinds. Search heuristics suggest, 
for example, how to increase the recall by deleting a facet, or how to increase precision by deleting 
ambiguous or overly broad terms in the facets (Harter, 1986, pp. 174-175). There are also a number 
of search heuristics related to the use of natural language words and controlled vocabularies. One of 
language heuristics advises the searcher to “take utmost care to identify all possible ways of 
representing a concept, if a language field such as title, abstract, or full text is the object of search” 
(Harter, 1986, p. 197). This search tip is useful in traditional database searching, because natural 
languages are extraordinarily rich in variety of ways ideas can be expressed. Further, Harter (1986, 
pp. 198-202) described command language, database and file structure heuristics such as “know the 
stop words used by the search system” and “always question null sets”. Moreover, there were recall 
and precision heuristics such as “use more generic terms in addition to specific terms to represent 
search concepts” and “use more restrictive proximity operators”.  
Another example of early studies approaching heuristics from the viewpoint of search 
tips is provided by Chen and Dhar (1991). Drawing on two empirical studies, they identified five 
types of information search strategies. Of them, the search-option-heuristics strategy is most 
pertinent for the present study because it explicitly refers to the use heuristic elements in searching, 
more specifically, the ways in which searchers use different online search options to perform subject-
based searches for unknown documents in some subject areas (Chen and Dhar, 1991, p. 411-413). In 
particular, controlled subject search, title search, keyword subject search and keyword title search 
appeared to be the four most frequently used search options.  
Based on the searchers´ ways to use the above options, Chen and Dhar (1991, pp. 411-
413) identified a “set of heuristics” that indicate appropriate situations for applying each search 
option. Unfortunately, however, the concept of “heuristics” was not characterized in greater detail. 
Nonetheless, it is evident that “heuristics” primarily refer to search techniques or tactics in the sense 
described by Bates (1979b). First, heuristic for controlled subject search is appropriate if the index 
terms have already been identified, possibly via other strategies such as the known-item-instantiation 
strategy (Chen and Dhar, 1991, pp. 411-412). For example, by using the search term “international 
corporation”, a searcher can get index terms such as international corporation - United States and 
international corporation - Japan. Second, the heuristic for keyword subject search draws on only a 
single-word input from the searchers. For example, by using “planning” in keyword subject search, 
the search system can match index terms such as “hierarchical planning” and “system planning”. 
Third, a heuristic for title search is appropriate for multi-word queries where search terms are likely 
to appear in the leftmost position of book titles. For example, by using “corporate finance” in title 
search, searchers can find books with titles like “corporate finance: an introduction” or “corporate 
finance for MBAs”. Fourth, users can make use of the heuristic for keyword title search. Similar to 
title search, keyword title search is appropriate when the search term is likely to appear in the book 
title. For example, by using “deregulation” in keyword title search, searchers can find all books that 
have the term “deregulation” in the title, such as “airline deregulation” and “deregulation of the 
banking industry”. Chen and Dhar (1991, pp. 413) remind that the search-option-heuristics strategy 
is iterative in nature. Searchers can use different search terms repeatedly until they are either satisfied 
or decide to give up.  
The above examples suggest that from the viewpoint of search tips, the heuristic 
elements of search tactics can be specified quite well. However, as Harter (1986, p. 201) reminded, 
the choice of a relevant search heuristic is not necessarily an easy task. Because there are no recipes 
applicable to every search situation, the searcher has to rely on his or her intuition, problem solving 
abilities and personal knowledge base in the choice of appropriate heuristics. Nonetheless, in order 
to help searchers, Harter (1986, p. 201) formulated a few “personal heuristics” such as “be willing to 
look at a search in more than one way”, and “evaluate your own work critically”. Heuristics of this 
kind come close to the idea tactics formulated by Bates (1979a). Even though personal heuristics 
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(Harter, 1986) and idea tactics (Bates, 1979a) were developed in times when Boolean database 
searching was the standard approach, it is obvious that some of the search tips such as “be willing to 
look at a search in more than one way” and “always question null sets” are relevant in web searching, 
too. 
 
Approaches to individual heuristics in strategies and tactics for information seeking   
 
Familiarity  
 
The conceptual analysis revealed that of the individual heuristics identified in HB and FFH studies, 
researchers have most often devoted attention to elements characteristic of the familiarity heuristic 
while conceptualizing the nature of strategies and tactics for information seeking and searching. As 
noted above, the familiarity heuristics is based on the recall of a particular information source that 
appeared to be useful in a past decision-making situation. The heuristic draws on the assumption that 
the circumstances underlying the past information-seeking behaviour still hold true for the present 
situation and that the past behaviour thus can be correctly applied to the new situation because such 
a behaviour is familiar in memory (Ashcraft and Radvansky, 2010, p. 442). 
Examples of studies in which the familiarity heuristic is identifiable from the 
characterizations of information search tactics and strategies can be found since the 1970s. For 
instance, Check - one of the search tactics identified by Bates draws on the familiarity heuristic 
because this tactic is based on the identification of similarities between earlier attempts to seek 
information: “review the original request and compare it to the current search topic to see that it is 
the same” (Bates, 1979b, p. 208). Later studies have shown that the familiarity heuristic is constitutive 
of web searching strategies, too. Fidel and associates (1999) identified the known site strategy, i.e., 
going directly to a website address that is known or guessed. Thatcher (2006, p. 1061) characterized 
a similar strategy, though he named it as a known address strategy. Users following this strategy go 
straight to a known site where he or she expects to find the information being sought. If they are able 
to recall the webpage address, they can type in it in the web browser address command line. They 
also can access the known webpage through their bookmark or favourites menu or by using the scroll 
bar if they had been to the webpage previously. More recently, Xie and Joo (2010, p. 266) identified 
a closely-related search strategy, that is, known-item initiation. Individuals making use of this strategy 
begin their search tasks from known sites that they are familiar with or that are recommended by 
someone else. Finally, Joseph (2013) demonstrated how the familiarity heuristic manifests itself in 
the use of mental shortcuts. Web searchers recall the search conducted previously and return to it if 
the website had saved into their “favourites” function of the search system, or if it was possible to 
access the information from their recent items folder.  
The nature of the familiarity heuristic has also been characterized in the context of 
credibility assessment. Credibility judgments form a significant part of information seeking and 
searching strategies because they result in the acceptance or rejection of a source candidate. 
Therefore, credibility assessment is particularly relevant from the viewpoint of choice heuristics. 
Based on an empirical study, Hilligoss and Rieh (2008, p. 1476) demonstrated that the familiarity 
heuristic occupies a significant role in this context because people often assess the credibility of a 
source by using a binary criterion: familiar versus unfamiliar sources. In this case, the familiarity 
heuristic leads to think that known sources are more credible than unfamiliar ones.  
 
Recognition  
 
According to Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011, p. 460), the recognition heuristic (RH) is based on a 
binary, all-or-none distinction: if one of two alternatives is recognized and the other is not, then infer 
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that the recognized alternative has the higher value with respect to the criterion. RH is particularly 
relevant from the perspective of Information Foraging theory (IFT) because it suggests that 
information sources are identified and accessed on the basis of their distinctiveness. IFT explains how 
people seek and gather information, and how they stop the information-seeking process (Pirolli and 
Card, 1999; Pirolli, 2007; Tomasi, 2014). IFT assumes that information is distributed in the 
environment much in the way that food is distributed in the wild, in clusters or “patches”. Such 
patches can vary in the amount of resources they contain (i.e., energy or information) and how easy 
these resources are to extract (Liu et al., 2016, p. 212).  
While making decisions on which particular patches to select and in which order, 
information foragers draw on information scent cues that inform the value or potential gain of the 
patches (Fu and Pirolli, 2007). More specifically, information scent may be defined as “terse 
representations of content ... whose trail leads to information of interest” (Pirolli, 2007, p. 69). Cues 
in the immediate environment - so-called “proximal cues” - let out a scent about the nature of “distal 
information” so that users can decide whether to pursue information by navigating towards particular 
sources or ignore it in favour of more promising search paths (Sundar et al., 2007, p. 366). 
Hyperlinked text on Web pages (indicated with an underline) is an oft-used example of a proximal 
cue that can possess a strong scent, weak scent, or no scent based on the degree to which the 
hyperlinked words overlap with the user's information needs. This suggests that the selection of an 
information source draws on RH: a source is either selected (accepted) or rejected (ignored), 
depending on whether an information scent recognized by an individual indicates high or low 
informational value. Strong scent suggests that a source has a value that distinguishes it positively 
from other source candidates. Thus understood, scent following based on RH is very much like 
heuristic search studied in human problem solving and in artificial intelligence (Pirolli and Card, 
1999, pp. 646-647). If the scent is recognized as sufficiently strong, the forager will be able to make 
the correct choice at each decision point. If there is no scent, the forager will perform a random walk, 
either literally in physical space or metaphorically in abstract search space (Pirolli, 2007, p. 62). RH 
also triggers a stopping behaviour: leave an information patch when the strength of the information 
scent falls below a certain threshold value.  
 
Representativeness 
 
The representativeness heuristic refers to a mental shortcut that is used when making judgments about 
the probability of an event under uncertainty or judging a situation based on how similar the prospects 
are to the prototypes the person holds in his or her mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This 
heuristic is used when an individual evaluates an information source, for example, a website by 
considering whether it is typical of a category. An individual thing has a high representativeness for 
a category if it is very similar to a prototype of that category, for example, an official website of a 
university. 
The use of the representativeness heuristic is obvious in situations in which people make 
judgments about the relevance of an information source by identifying the genre to which it belongs. 
For example, Ross (1999) examined the criteria by which people identify and choose pleasure 
reading. The findings indicate that such criteria draw on a great deal originate from “behind the eyes” 
knowledge that the reader brings to the particular text - knowledge about genres, authors, cover art, 
and the reputation of publishers; memory of reviews and advice from friends, as well as the ability to 
perform tests on the text itself by reading a sample paragraph or page (Ross, 1999, p. 797). Each 
successful choice makes it more likely that the reader will repeat the rewarding experience by reading 
something further. On the other hand, the findings of her study suggest that the representativeness 
heuristic does not alone dictate the choices because the readers may simultaneously draw on heuristics 
of other types such as choosing by liking (Frederick, 2002). As the motivators for seeking for pleasure 
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reading tend to affectively coloured, choosing by liking heuristic may occupy a central role because 
it suggests preferring an option that generates the most favorable affective response. 
The representativeness heuristic is also embedded in the credibility assessment of 
information sources of diverse types. This heuristic can manifest itself in rules of thumb affecting the 
scrutiny or skepticism with which one can approach information found in a given media format 
(Hilligoss and Rieh, 2008, pp. 1476-1477). For example, if people develop media-related 
representativeness heuristics about certain digital media such as online discussion forums, they may 
not need to examine various characteristics of information sources in order to evaluate the information 
they encounter. An individual may also draw on a heuristic of this kind while assessing the credibility 
of books, peer-reviewed journal articles, blogs, and libraries. The representativeness heuristic may 
suggest, for example, that the peer-review process lies behind the positive judgment of the credibility 
of scholarly journal articles. The representativeness heuristic can also be based on endorsement-based 
beliefs: a particular information source is judged as credible because it has been endorsed, 
recommended, or otherwise upheld by knowledgeable and trusted individuals. In this case, the 
representativeness heuristic might also be labeled as a kind of “authority heuristics”, because one of 
the major criteria for assigning credibility to an information source is whether it can be categorized 
as an official authority (Sundar, 2008, p. 75; 84). For example, a message on a Web site about a health 
issue may be more likely to be taken on face value (i.e., without much scrutiny or counter 
argumentation) if an information seeker finds out that the message is endorsed by a seemingly expert 
source such as the American Medical Association. 
 
Discussion 
 
The present study examined the nature of heuristic elements of strategies and tactics for information 
seeking and searching. Such elements were approached by drawing on the ideas developed within the 
HB and FFH research programmes. The study showed that researchers have rarely detailed the 
heuristic elements of strategies and tactics for information seeking and searching the heuristic 
elements. At the highest level of generality, heuristic elements are associated with browsing strategies 
in particular (e.g., Marchionini, 1995). A more specific picture of heuristics is based on the 
identification of search tips which may be used to facilitate the search process (Bates, 1979b; Harter, 
1986). Overall, these two approaches were particularly characteristic of early studies on this topic. 
Even though the number of studies explicitly characterizing the nature of individual heuristics in 
information seeking is relatively low, more recent investigations have provided somewhat more 
detailed picture of the familiarity, recognition and representativeness heuristics in particular. These 
findings are summarized in Table II. 
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 Familiarity Recognition Representativeness 
Key rationale behind 
the heuristic 
 
Events are judged as 
more frequent or 
important because 
they are more familiar 
in memory (Ashcraft 
and Radvansky, 2010, 
p. 442).  
 
If one of two 
alternatives is 
recognized and the 
other is not, the 
recognized alternative 
has the higher value 
with respect to the 
criterion (Gigerenzer 
and Gaissmaier, 2011, 
p. 460). 
Making judgments 
about the probability 
of an event under 
uncertainty or judging 
a situation based on 
how similar the 
prospects are to the 
prototypes the person 
holds in his or her 
mind (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). 
The use of the 
heuristic in 
information seeking 
and searching 
Recalling situations in 
which an information 
source provided useful 
information in the past 
and preferring the 
same source on the 
basis of earlier use 
experiences 
Binary, all-or-none 
distinction of an 
information object in 
an environment; an 
information source is 
preferred on the basis 
of its distinctiveness 
Evaluating the 
relevance of an 
information source  
on the basis of its 
typicality or genre 
 
 
Examples of the 
approaches to 
individual heuristics 
as elements of 
strategies and tactics 
for information 
seeking and 
searching 
Information search 
tactics, e.g., Check  
(Bates, 1979b) 
Known site strategy, 
(Fidel et al., 1999) 
Known address 
strategy (Thatcher, 
2006)  
Credibility judgment 
based on the 
familiarity with an 
information source 
(Hilligoss and Rieh, 
2008). 
Recognition of 
“information scent” as 
a proximal cue of the 
relevance of an 
information source 
particularly in 
electronic 
environments 
(Fu and Pirolli, 2007; 
Pirolli, 2007; Sundar 
et al., 2007; Tomasi, 
2014). 
Identification of 
relevant genres while 
seeking for pleasure 
reading (Ross, 1999) 
Credibility judgment 
based on media-
related and 
endorsement-based 
beliefs of sources´ 
authoritativeness  
(Hilligoss and Rieh, 
2008; Sundar, 2008). 
 
Table II. Approaches to three key heuristics as elements of strategies and tactics for information 
seeking and searching. 
 
As Table II indicates, the repertoire of studies characterizing the familiarity heuristic 
ranges from the conceptualizations of search tactics to web searching strategies such as known-item 
initiation and judging source credibility on the basis of its familiarity. The recognition heuristic has 
primarily been conceptualized in the context of the Information Foraging theory. This heuristic 
advises to prefer an information source that can be distinguished from others due to “information 
scent. Finally, the representativeness heuristic has mainly been characterized in the context of 
credibility judgment. This heuristic draws on the identification of diverse genres of information 
sources, based on the beliefs about their typical content.  
Overall, the findings indicate that role of other heuristics has remained marginal in the 
conceptualizations of the strategies and tactics for information seeking and searching. For example, 
no sufficiently clear examples could be found of the use of the take-the-best (TTB) heuristic. 
However, searchers may draw on it, at least implicitly. We may speculate, for example, that Cut - one 
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of the file structure tactics identified by Bates (1979b, p. 209) incorporates the elements of TTB. This 
tactic advises the searcher as follows: “When selecting among several ways to search a given query, 
to Cut is to choose the option that cuts out, eliminates, the largest part of the search domain at once” 
(Bates, 1979b, p. 209). This tactic follows the maxim of TTB suggesting "take the best, ignore the 
rest” (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996, pp. 653-654). Naturally, the successful use of the Cut tactic 
requires that the searcher is able to identify the “best” part of the search domain on the basis of 
minimal cues. Similarly, thus far, the role of the choosing by liking heuristic has not been examined 
in greater detail in information behaviour research. This heuristic draws on an affectively-coloured 
immediate evaluation, which is governed by rapid and intuitive processes, resulting in liking or 
disliking of diverse options. The use of this heuristic is obvious in aesthetics-based credibility 
judgments because they can be connected to the evaluation of the credibility and aesthetic design in 
Web sites (Hilligoss and Rieh, 2008, p. 1477). For example, an individual may prefer a website based 
on the quality of its layout.  
The above examples suggest that there is a considerable potential for further research 
in the study of strategies and tactics for information seeking and searching. One of the research topics 
is the nature of unconscious use of heuristics, often referred to as intuition (Mousavi and Gigerenzer, 
2014, p. 1673). Studies examining intuitive judgment and decision making are highly relevant for the 
elaboration of the picture of heuristics more generally. Allen (2011, p. 2116) draws attention to the 
fact that although the concept of intuition is still contested, it is widely used in information seeking 
serving the ends of decision making. In information behaviour literature, intuitive decision making is 
often linked with the HB approach suggesting that decision making of this type would lead to 
suboptimal decision making (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). Nevertheless, as Allen (2011, p. 2168) 
points out, studies on information processing within cognitive and social psychology, social cognitive 
neuroscience, and decision research have led to a resurgence of interest in intuition and information 
processing. Within the field of information behaviour, however, the concept of intuition is under-
theorized, and it has not been incorporated into mainstream models of information behaviour.  On the 
other hand, as Allen´s (2011, p. 2179) empirical findings demonstrate, intuitive decision making 
should not be examined as a separate category. Instead, there is a need to analyze the “dance” between 
deliberative and intuitive modes of information behaviour as complementary, rather than conflicting 
systems of information processing. The same conclusion about the complementarity rather than 
conflict applies to the role of heuristic and analytical modes of information seeking. 
To clarify the nature of diverse heuristics, the present study has approached them as 
separate categories. However, it is evident that strategies and tactics for information seeking and 
searching can simultaneously incorporate elements of diverse heuristics. For example, familiarity, 
representativeness and choosing by liking heuristics may occur together while an individual identifies 
and selects information sources. Diverse heuristics can support each other, resulting in an immediate 
acceptance or rejection of a source. Alternatively, diverse heuristics can compete with each other. An 
initial judgment based on choosing by liking heuristic may be positive, due to an attractive layout of 
a website, but the representativeness heuristic suggests that the credibility of this source is somewhat 
dubious because it seems to belong to the category of “infotainment”, for example. In these cases, the 
final decision of the acceptance or rejection may require systematic cognitive effort to evaluate the 
relevance of the information source, as suggested by the heuristic-systematic model of information 
processing developed by Chaiken (1980).   
More research is needed to find out how the use of diverse heuristics affects the 
decisions on source preferences. The research setting is complicated by the fact that heuristics are not 
necessarily stable constructs or manifestations of information-seeking habits (Hilligoss and Rieh, 
2008, p. 1473). A person making a credibility judgment based on certain cues from a source of 
information may find later that the judgment contradicts the original heuristic. In such cases, the 
current heuristic can be elaborated by incorporating new elements regarding the representativeness 
of certain sources or the degree they are found familiar.  
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The findings have implications for the design of information search systems. As the 
search tactics and idea tactics proposed by Bates (1979a; 1979b), as well as heuristic search tips 
formulated by Chen and Dhar (1991) and Harter, 1986) date back to the pre-Internet era, they may 
have limited value in Web searching. Nevertheless, as Smith (2012) demonstrates, the repertoire of 
search tips can updated by developing new search tactics such as Parallel and Context in order to 
support Web searchers. However, the heuristic support provided by search systems is probably most 
useful in the context of exploratory search because it is open-ended, opportunistic and multi-faceted 
in nature (White and Roth, 2009, p. 5). There are various possibilities to support exploratory 
information-seeking processes by providing heuristic cues. For example, information systems could 
be developed to help users formulate queries, as well as adjust queries and views on search results in 
real time (White and Roth, 2009, pp. 41-59). Moreover, there is a need to develop search systems 
which allow users to explore and filter results through the selection of facets and document metadata. 
It is also increasingly important to offer visualizations to support insight and decision making. In this 
regard, the support of recognition heuristics such as information scent holds a particular potential for 
system design.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Heuristics are common, though largely unexplored elements of information behaviour. Overall, the 
study of such elements is still in its infancy in the field of information science. Research on this topic 
has not much progressed since the 1970s and 1980s when first attempts were made to identify 
information search tactics (Bates, 1979b) and develop tips for database searching (Harter, 1986). The 
dearth of research suggests that the analysis of heuristics is an intellectually demanding topic; 
heuristics are difficult to conceptualize and capture empirically. Despite relatively scarce research 
material, the present study provided two main contributions to information behaviour research. First, 
the study elucidated the nature of heuristics in the particular context of strategies and tactics for 
information seeking and searching by drawing on the findings of two prominent research 
programmes, that is, Heuristics and Biases (HB), and Fast and Frugal Heuristics (FFH). Second, the 
study provided examples of the ways in which three key heuristics identified by HB and FFH scholars 
have been conceptualized in the investigations of strategies and tactics for information seeking and 
searching.  
These findings of the present study are explorative and thus not generalizable to other 
domains of information behaviour research. The findings are also limited in that they focus on three 
heuristics only: familiarity, recognition and representativeness. Additional research is needed to 
examine the role of other heuristics such as choosing by liking, as well as the role of intuition in the 
selection of information sources. These issues are gaining new importance in times of an ever growing 
information supply from the Internet in particular. To fight the information overload and to ease the 
search process, people prefer satisficing approaches by making use of mental shortcuts. Another 
critical factor strengthening the role of heuristics such as choosing by liking is convenience in 
accessing information sources: people want information conveniently and quickly (Connaway et al., 
2011). To examine the above assumptions in more detail, empirical investigations are needed to 
elucidate the nature of heuristics in real-life information seeking and searching, both in work-related 
as well as everyday contexts such as health and leisure. 
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